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CryptoGloria
Wallets

Choosing a device

Checked 24 Aug 2026 9 min read

We do not rank them. Here is what genuinely differs between devices, so the comparison you make is your own.

We do not publish rankings, and this page is the clearest example of why. The right device depends on what you hold, which networks you use and how you actually behave — and a numbered list would hide all three behind somebody else's preference.

What follows is the set of things that genuinely differ. Once you know which of them matter to you, the choice mostly makes itself.

How it talks to your computer

USB is the most common: plug in, confirm on the device. Simple, and the cable carries only the transaction, never the key.

Bluetooth exists on some devices for phone use. Convenient, and it adds a wireless surface that the signing model does not require.

QR codes mean the device never physically connects to anything. Your computer displays a code, the device reads it with a camera, and shows a code back. Slower, and it removes the connection entirely.

MicroSD works the same way with a card carrying the file between the two machines.

The screen

Since the screen is what you verify against, its size decides how much you can actually check. A small screen shows an address in fragments and truncates contract details; a larger one can display the whole thing at once.

This matters much more if you interact with contracts than if you only send coins between addresses.

Open or closed firmware

Some devices publish all their code for anyone to inspect. Others keep parts closed, usually the portion that talks to a certified secure chip, because the chip maker's terms require it.

Both positions have serious people behind them, and the disagreement is real rather than marketing. Open firmware means independent researchers can audit what the device does. A certified secure element is purpose-built to resist somebody physically attacking the chip. A few devices try to have both by separating the two concerns.

Which you weight more heavily depends on what you are defending against: a supply-chain or software problem, or a person with your device in their hands.

Long-established makers, named without ranking

Devices from Trezor, Ledger, Coldcard, BitBox and Keystone have all been on sale for years, have public track records and are widely documented. That is the bar we use for naming anything: verifiable history, not our opinion of it.

What it supports

Some devices deliberately support only Bitcoin. Others support thousands of assets across many networks. Neither is better; they are different products.

Check specifically for the networks you actually use, and check whether they work with the wallet software you prefer — the device holds the key, but you still need an interface, and not every combination is supported.

Passphrase support

Most devices let you add a word of your own on top of the seed, producing an entirely separate wallet. It is a real security gain and a real way to lose everything: forget that word and the correct twelve words open an empty wallet, with no error and no clue that anything is missing.

Price, honestly

Entry devices cost roughly what a decent meal out costs. The most expensive are perhaps four or five times that.

Every one of them removes the same category of risk. The extra money buys a better screen, an air-gapped connection method or a particular security architecture — not a fundamentally safer key. If the choice is between an entry device today and a better one at some undefined point in the future, take the entry device today.

Buy direct from the manufacturer, never second hand

Not a marketplace listing, not an auction, not a "sealed" bargain. A tampered device can be prepared so that the seller already knows the phrase, and it will behave completely normally while it drains you.

Setting it up

  1. Let the device generate the phrase itselfIt must appear on the device screen, not on your computer, and not in the box. A phrase supplied by anyone else is not yours.
  2. Write it down by hand, on paperThen check every word against the device before going further. A misread word is discovered years later, at the worst moment.
  3. Send a small amount firstConfirm it arrives and shows up on the device.
  4. Test the recovery before you trust itWipe the device and restore it from your written phrase. Nothing else proves the backup works, and this is the step almost everybody skips.

That last step is the difference between having a backup and believing you have one. Do it while the balance is small enough that being wrong costs nothing.

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